University of Baltimore Law

ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Scholarship

3-1996

Consistently Inconsistent: The Supreme Court and
The Confusion Surrounding Proportionality in
Non-Capital Sentencing
Steven P. Grossman
University of Baltimore School of Law, sgrossman@ubalt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure
Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United
States Commons
Recommended Citation
Consistently Inconsistent: The Supreme Court and The Confusion Surrounding Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing, Criminal
Practice Law Report, Vol. 4, No. 3, March, 1996

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

CRIMINAL PRACTICE
LAW REPORT
March 1996

Vol. 4, No.3

CONSISTENTLY INCONSISTENT: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE CONFUSION SURROUNDING PROPORTIONALITY IN
NONCAPITAL SENTENCING*
by Steven Grossman
Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law

There has always been debate about
how, why and to what extent society
should punish individuals who violate
its norms. In this country that debate
has been conducted on primarily two
levels. First, in legislatures and among
punishment theorists the debate has
revolved around what are the appropriate goals of a criminal justice system and how can a sentencing framework be developed to best accomplish
those goals. Second, in the courts,
particularly the Supreme Court, the
debate has involved the meaning of
the ban on cmel and unusual punishment contained within the Eighth
Amendment of the Constitution.
This issue of CRJMINAL PRACTICE
LAW REPORT examines the Supreme
Court ' s treatment of the Eighth
Amendment with respect to claims of
excessiveness regarding prison sentences. Specifically, it addresses the
issue of whether and to what degree
the Eighth Amendment requires that
a punishment not be disproportional
to the crime punished. In analyzing
all of the modern holdings of the
Court in this area, one finds significant fault with each. The result of this
series of flawed opinions from the
Supreme Court is that the state of the
*Adapted by permission from 84 Ky. L. J.
107 (1 995).

law with respect to proportionality in
sentencing is confused, and what law
can be discerned rests on weak foundations.

Rummel v. Estelle
The modern approach to the application of an Eighth Amendment-based
proportionality principle for prison
sentences began with the Supreme
Court's holding in Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U .S. 263 (1980). Rummel was
sentenced under a Texas recidivist
statute that required life imprisonment
for anyone convicted of a felony. He
argued that such a sentence was disproportionate to the offense of which
he was convicted or even to the three
aggregate felonies that were used to
trigger the recidivist statute.
Rummel was convicted by a jury
in 1973 of theft, for obtaining $120.75
by false pretenses. Under the relevant
Texas statute, theft of more than $50
was punishable by two to ten years in
prison . The state, however, chose to
prosecute Rummel under the Texas
felony recidivist statute. The two previous felony convictions offered by
the state were a 1964 plea of guilt to
fraudulently using a credit card to
obtain $80 worth of services and a
1969 plea to passing a forged check
of $28.36. Rummel had received

prison terms of three and four years
respectively for these two prior convictions. After his 1973 conviction,
the trial judge imposed the life sentence mandated by the recidivist
statute.
The Supreme Court concluded that
setting the maximum length of prison
sentences for criminal offenses is a
role properly handled by legislatures
and not appellate courts . The Court
based this conclusion both on its perception of how the Eighth Amendment has previously been interpreted
by the Court in this realm and on its
view of the proper role of judges in
the sentencing process. In both of
these areas, the Court began a series
ofunpersuasive and unfortunate opinions with respect to the application of
the principle of proportionality in sentencing.
The Court in Rummel divided its

. . . the state of
the law with
respect to
proportionality
in sentencing is
confused ...
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analysis of its previous holdings involving Eighth
Amendment proportionality into death penalty cases and
those involving imprisonment. As to the former, the Court
concluded that since death is a unique form of punishment, previous Supreme Court decisions in capital cases
that had clearly discerned a proscription against disproportional sentencing within the Eighth Amendment were
"oflimited assistance" in assessing whether jail sentences
could be impermissibly long. Regarding noncapital cases,
the Court said that successful challenges to the proportionality of such sentences were "exceedingly rare" and,
in fact, analyzed only one such case, Weems v. U.S., 217
u.s. 349 (1910).
Decided in 1910, Weems was the first opinion of the
Supreme Court that clearly identified a requirement for
proportional sentencing within the Eighth Amendment.
Weems, a disbursing officer for the Coast Guard, stationed in the Philippines, was convicted of falsifying a
cash book in the amount of 616 pesos. For this offense,
Weems received a fine plus fifteen years of a punishment called "cadena temporal." During the cadena, the
prisoner is chained from the ankles and wrists and forced
to perform what the Court called "hard and painful labor," 217 U.S. at 364. Even after the incarceration period is over, the offender has no marital authority, neither parental nor property rights, and is subject to lifelong surveillance.
Weems claimed that his punishment was cruel and
unusual because of its harshness and oppressiveness,
and because the length of the sentence was disproportionate to the offense he committed. In its decision
that his sentence was violative of the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court seemed to accept both of
Weems' rationales.
The Court in Rummel, while acknowledging that the
earlier holding had found Weems' sentence to be disproportional to his offense, attributed this finding primarily
to the "unique" nature of the cadena punishment and not
its length. The Weems opinion was characterized by the
Court ii.1 Rummel as "consistently referring jointly to the
length of imprisonment and its 'accessories' of 'accompaniments'," 445 U.S. at 272, 273.
The analysis of Weems undertaken by the Court in
Rummel is deficient in that it omits those aspects of the
earlier holding that support the position that Weems' sentence was violative of the Eighth Amendment for two
separate reasons, its length and its harshness. Furthermore, the Court placed no weight on those parts of the
decision in Weems that declared proportionality to be an
essential component of the Eighth Amendment without
alluding to the nature or uniqueness of the cadena sentence. Thus, while Weems may not be a definitive holding that length of imprisonment alone can make a sentence unconstitutionally disproportionate to an offense,

it offers far stronger support for this position than is suggested by the Court in Rummel.
The Court in Rummel was similarly dismissive of the
relevance of those cases involving capital punishment
that had clearly identified a proportionality principle in
the Eighth Amendment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at
153 (1976), which held that the death penalty was constitutional at least in certain circumstances, and Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. at 584 (1977), holding that capital
punishment is disproportionate to the crime of raping an
adult woman, had both been decided only a few years
before Rummel. Each of these decisions held that punishments excessive in relation to the crimes committed
were violative of the proportionality requirement of the
Eighth Amendment. Furthermore, each decision made
clear that excessiveness alone, without regard to the barbaric nature of the punishment, was sufficient to invalidate a sentence. The Court in Rummel found these pronouncements on excessiveness, because they appeared
in capital cases, to be "of limited assistance" in deciding
the constitutionality of terms of imprisonment
Assuming arguendo both that the death penalty is a
unique form of punishment and the questionable notion
that the Court's pronouncements in capital cases have
no bearing on other sentences, the Court in Rummel was
still remiss in ignoring the manner in which those capital
cases interpreted earlier proportionality holdings of the
Court. Such an omission is particularly glaring when
those earlier proportionality cases did not themselves
involve capital sentences.
The Rummel Court was also understandably concerned
with the possibility that appellate judges might use a proportional sentencing requirement to substitute their views
as to what constitutes an appropriate sentence in a given
case for that of the trial judge or the legislature. Rummel
attempted to demonstrate that his sentence should be
deemed unconstitutionally excessive through the application of reasonably objective criteria, arguing that both
the fact that his crimes were nonviolent and that individually or even collectively the crimes involved relatively small amounts of money were objective evidence
of the nonserious nature of his crimes. The Court, however, considered the seriousness of any crime to be an
inherently subjective question and regarded it as a matter for each state to determine, according to its particular
needs and interests. In this instance, said the Court, Texas
was responding primarily to the problem of recidivism
and not merely the specific crimes for which Rummel
was convicted. Once recidivist statutes are deemed to be
rational responses to the problem of repeat offenders (and
Rummel did not challenge this), how the statute is structured is a matter of line-drawing, according to the Court
Regarding such line-drawing to be a legislative function,
the Court rejected Rummel's attempt to fashion a judi-
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cial approach to assess the excessiveness of a legislatively sanctioned sentence.
The judicial struggle over the application of the Eighth
Amendment to proportional sentencing was thus to be
fought primarily on two fronts: interpretation of earlier
Supreme Court cases (and later, other historical sources)
and the existence of criteria that meaningfully objectify
an appellate court's determination as to whether a particular sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime
committed.

ounces of marijuana. Justice Powell, who authored a dissent in Rummel, also believed that Davis' sentence was
disproportional to his crimes but felt constrained by the
holding in Rummel to concur in this case.
Thus, something of a three way division among the
justices developed in Davis with respect to how to approach proportionality challenges. It is difficult to discern clearly whether this division was one of degree or
one of kind. The majority apparently believed that such
challenges should rarely, if ever, be successful, using
again the never-in-a lifetime example of life imprisonment for overtime parking. To Justice Powell, discerning whether such a "rare" situation exists apparently depends on whether the offense and sentence in the challenged case are more disprop01tionate than those involved
in Rummel's case (and presumably hereafter in Davis'
case as well). The dissenters seem to regard Rummel as
limited to recidivist statutes and would apparently advocate that appellate courts in other cases should engage in
proportionality analysis in keeping with the Eighth
Amendment's "evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society," quoting from Trap v.
Dulles, 350 U.S. at 101 (1958).
Davis was particularly noteworthy because the Supreme Court had held that a sentence of forty years incarceration for possession and distribution of nine ounces
of marijuana was not violative of the Eighth Amendment.
As Davis was not sentenced under a recidivist statute,
the focus of any analysis had to be the particular crime
committed. If such a lengthy sentence for the sale of a
moderate amount of a relatively nondangerous drug was

Hutto v. Davis

)

The first time after Rummel that the Supreme Court had
the opportunity to confront an Eighth Amendment proportionality challenge to a noncapital sentence was the
case of Roger Trenton Davis, Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S.
370 (1982). Davis had been sentenced by a jury in Virginia to a total of forty years imprisonment and a fine of
$20,000, based on his convictions for distribution and
possession with intent to distribute a total of nine ounces
of marijuana.
In reversing the holding of the Fourth Circuit that
Davis' sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, the
Supreme Court wrote a terse per curiam opinion that
appeared to foreclose virtually any proportionality challenge in a noncapital case. The Court observed that the
decision in Rummel had made clear that any assessment
of the excessiveness of a prison term was inherently subjective and therefore "purely a matter of legislative prerogative," 454 U.S. at 373. The per curiam opinion reiterated that because of the unique nature of the death penalty, the Court's pronouncements regarding
proportionality requirements in capital cases had little
relevance outside that realm. Furthermore, the Court
noted that in Rummel it had rejected each of the purported objectifying criteria that had been relied upon by
the district court in granting the writ. The Court in Davis,
again reiterating what it held in Rummel, warned that
successful challenges to the proportionality of sentences
should be "exceedingly rare" and offered life imprisonment for overtime parking as an example of such an extraordinary situation.
Justice Brennan, writing for three dissenters, argued
that while the language in Rummel may be expansive, its
holding is limited to the premise that Texas had validly
chosen to punish habitual offenders severely in order to
have a strong deterrent impact on prospective recidivists.
In citing approvingly prior decisions such as Weems, the
Court in Rummel, according to Brennan, did not advocate abandonment of all disproportionality analysis. To
Brennan, a sentence of forty years imprisonment, roughly
thirteen times greater than the average for others in Virginia convicted of the same crimes, is grossly disproportionate to the crimes of distributing and possessing nine

CRIMINAL PRACTICE
LAW REPORT
Coordinating Editor

John M. Burkoff

Publisher's Staff
Mark D. Pellis , Legal Editor
Michael G. Lindquist, Manuscript Editor
Will Croxton, Electronic Composition
Mara Griffin, Production Editor
Published eleven times per year by
Clark Boardman Callaghan
Editorial Offices: 375 Hudson Street,
New York , New York 10014
Fax: 212-924-0460
Tel. : 212-929-7500
Customer Service: 155 Pfingsten Road ,
Deerfield, Illinois 60015
Tel. : 800-323-1336
Fax: 708-948-9340
Subscription: $190 for eleven issues
Copyright 1996 Clark Boardman Callaghan,
a division of Thomson Information Services , Inc.
ISSN 1068-6215

19

not deemed disproportional, it is hard to imagine a sentence that would be so viewed by the Court. At least it
was until one year later when the Court decided Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S . at 277 (1983).

sonal predilections of each appellate judge. With this in
mind, Justice Powell offered objectifying criteria that the
Court had used in other cases for assessing the constitutionality of a sentence.
First, Powell advocated looking to the nature of the
crime and its seriousness. Second, the Court regarded as
"helpful" a comparison between the sentence at issue and
sentences for similar or more serious crimes in the subject jurisdiction. Third, the Court viewed as "useful" a
comparison between the sentence at hand and that which
offenders receive for the same crime in other jurisdictions. In discussing the above objectifying criteria, Justice Powell unfortunately and perhaps necessarily omitted the analysis of those factors that was performed by
the Court in Rummel. In that case, as well as in Davis,
the Court's analysis led to a specific rejection of the three
factors adopted by the Court in Helm .
However, the Court in Helm did take issue with the
assertion in these earlier decisions that an assessment of
the seriousness of a crime was too subjective a determination to inform a decision as to the proportionality of a
sentence. The Court pointed out that based on clearly
established principles, it is well accepted that certain
crimes are considered more serious than others. Without
enunciating all such principles, the Court said that seriousness can be determined by looking to, among other
things, the harm caused by the crime, the use or threat to
use violence, the intent of the criminal, whether a crime
is a lesser included offense, and whether the criminal is
a principal or merely an accessory after the fact.
In addressing the criticism of the use of the factor that
compares sentences among other jurisdictions, the Court in
Helm acknowledged that under our federalist system, some
states would invariably impose harsher sentences forcertain crimes. However, this does not justify dismissing this
factor, according to the Court, but argues for the use of a
combination of factors with no one alone determining
disproportionality. Having defended its adoption of the three
objectifying criteria, what remained for the Court was to
apply the factors to Helm's crime and punishment.
In applying the first objectifying factor, the gravity of ·
the crime, the Court noted that Helm's crime of uttering
a no account check for $100 was '"one of the most passive felonies a person could commit' ," 463 U.S. at 296.
The crime was completely nonviolent and involved a
relatively small amount of money. Although acknowledging that it was proper to sentence Helm for his past
crimes as well, the Court regarded these prior crimes also
as "relatively minor." Notably absent from the Court's
assessment of the gravity of Helm's crimes was any comparison between the seriousness of Helm's criminal
record and that of Rummel. This omission is particularly
glaring as the Court's assessment of the harshness of
Helm's sentence relied significantly on a comparison to

Solem v. Helm
Jerry Helm was convicted of uttering a no account check
in 1979, a felony under South Dakota law. The maximum sentence for that crime ordinarily was five years
incarceration and a $5000 fine. Helm, however, was sentenced under South Dakota's recidivist statute, which
imposed life imprisonment upon conviction of a fourth
felony. A companion statute prohibited parole for those
sentenced to life imprisonment. Unlike the opinion of
the Court in Rummel, Justice Powell, speaking for the
Court in Helm, saw no ambiguity in Weems with respect
to its endorsement of an Eighth Amendment-based proportionality requirement. Powell identified further support for a proportionality requirement in other, later cases
decided by the Court. Robinson v. California, 337 U.S.
660 (1962); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
While conceding that in both Rummel and Davis the Court
had indicated that proportionality challenges to the length
of jail sentences would rarely be successful, Justice Powell
interpreted both decisions as leaving the door somewhat
open to such challenges. In confronting the language in
Rummel that seemed to foreclose proportionality challenges
to the length of sentences, Justice Powell offered an interpretation that is at best unpersuasi ve and perhaps somewhat
disingenuous. The Court in Rummel wrote that, "one could
argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this
Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable
as felonies ... the length of sentence actually imposed is
purely a matter of legislative prerogative," 445 U.S. at 274.
Speaking for the Court in Helm, Justice Powell imposed on
the words "one could argue" an interpretation that is literal
to the extreme. To Powell, the Court in Rummel with these
words "did not adopt the standard proposed but merely recognized that the argument was possible," 463 U.S. at 288 n.
14. In addition, Justice Powell apparently ignored the words
that followed, "without fear of contradiction." Taken together, these words hardly support Justice Powell's interpretation that the Court in Rummel was apparently posing a
hypothetical argument. However, apparently unwilling to
hold that the Court was wrong in Rummel when it declared
that appellate courts have no role in ensuring that sentences
are proportional, Justice Powell and the majority in Helm
were forced into this interpretation.
Some method then must be devised, according to Justice Powell, to assess the proportionality of a sentence to
the offense committed. Principally, this method must to
some extent objectify the proportionality determination
so that it does not become merely a reflection of the per-
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Rummel's sentence. Perhaps this omission occurred bethe rehabilitative project," 463 U.S. at 300, usually embodycause, in the words of the dissent, "by comparison
ing specific procedures and standards. While one may leRummel was a relatively 'model citizen'," 463 U.S. at
gitimately have an expectation of parole at some time, the
304 (Burger, C.J., diss' g).
granting of executive clemency, according to the Court, was
In comparing South Dakota's treatment of other compurely ad hoc. The Court further noted that South Dakota in
parable and more serious crimes, the next objectifying
fact had rarely commuted life sentences and even if comfactor, the Court noted that only crimes far more serious
mutation occurred, that would only make Helm eligible for
than Helm's, such as murder or kidnapping, could result
parole.
in life imprisonment. Acknowledging that Helm's senThe distinction drawn by the Court in Helm between
tence as a recidivist compelled it to con- ,----------------, parole and commutation through executive
sider his prior crimes as well, the Court
. . . serzousness
clemency, based on their respective likemaintained that even for second or third
lihoods, is a reasonable one. It would skew
[for purposes of
an attempt to apportion crime to punishtime felons to receive life imprisonment,
proportionality
ment were the Court to ignore the differthe crimes at issue had to befar graver than
those committed by Helm. While this may
ence between a sentence that will likely
review can be
result in the defendant's release and one
be true, it could be argued that the state
determined by
for which the possibility of release is just
has related but somewhat separate goals
in incarcerating for life someone who, by
one step beyond the theoretical. What is
being convicted of seven felonies in eleven
looking to,
debatable is the Court's assertion in Helm
years, has demonstrated complete disreamong other
that the opinion in Rummel "relied
gard for society's laws. Such a goal can
things, the harm
heavily" on Rummel's possible parole.
take the form of general deterrence, by
The Court in Rummel specifically recommunicating to other potential recidicaused by the
jected the state's attempt to treat Rummel's
crime, the use or sentence as something less than life imvists that there is a limit to their felonious
prisonment because of the possibility of
criminal activity. It can take the form of
retribution or just desserts by making the
threat to use
parole. It did, however, note that an asviolence, the
sessment of Rummel's sentence "could
societal statement that those who continuously ignore our laws against committing
hardly ignore" the possibility of release
nonpetty crimes deserve to be incarcerated
intent of the
and this possibility distinguished Texas'
criminal,
statute from one that contains no parole
for life. While neither of these goals neeessarily justify the specific sentence in
possibility.
whether a crime
The result of the holdings in Rummel,
Helm's case, the Court should have considered these traditional sentencing goals.
is a lesser
Davis and Helm was to send a mixed and
In applying the final objectifying facconfusing message with respect to the Suincluded offense, preme Court's approach to the requirement
tor, the Court in Helm adopted the finding
of the Court of Appeals that in only one
and whether the
of proportional sentencing. Reconciling the
criminal is a
three holdings, all still deemed by the Court
other state could Helm, as a recidivist, have
to be good law, was no easy task for lower
received life imprisonment for the crime
he committed.
principal or
courts attempting to assess proportionality
merely an
challenges. Is there a clear proscription
After concluding that each of the three
objectifying criteria pointed to the
against grossly disproportionate sentences;
disproportionality of Helm's sentence, the
accessory after
to what types of cases does this proscription
the fact.
apply; and how do we assess such challenges
Court turned to the severity of the sentence
itself. Specifically, the Court rejected the
were all questions that seemed to produce
state's attempt to compare Helm's sentence
different answers when looking at Rummell
with the sentence received by Rummel. The Court noted
Davis as opposed to Helm. It is therefore hardly surprising
that under Texas law Rummel was eligible for parole, and
that eight years after Helm was decided the Court again
that parole could be granted as early as ten years into his
waded into the proportionality morass.
sentence and could be reasonably expected in twelve years.
Harmelin v. Michigan
Under South Dakota law, Helm had no possibility of parole
and could be released only through executive clemency. The
InHarmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), Harmelin
Court in Helm regarded the distinction between the possiwas convicted of possession of 672 grams of cocaine
bility of parole and commutation through clemency to be
under a Michigan law that mandated life imprisonment
"fundamental." It viewed the former as a "regular part of
without parole for possessing a large amount of drugs.

J
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In the Supreme Court, five justices joined in Justice
Scalia's opinion holding that while severe mandatory
punishments could be considered cruel, they were not
historically unusual. These justices agreed that the obligation that exists in capital cases for the sentencer to
consider all mitigating facts related to the crime and the
offender does not apply to noncapital sentences. Contrary to the defendant's assertion that as with capital punishment, life imprisonment without parole is a unique
sentence, the Court held that such a sentence is actually
more similar to other sentences of life imprisonment.
Therefore, according to a majority of the Court, no special protection such as the requirement to consider mitigating factors applied to sentences such as that received
by Harmelin. Unfortunately for courts that would have
to wrestle with proportionality challenges in the future,
the members of the Court agreed on little else.
The same five justices agreed that Harmelin's sentence
was not grossly disproportionate to his crime but disagreed
among themselves on such critical issues as why the sentence was constitutional, whether the Eighth Amendment
contains any meaningful limitation on noncapital sentences
and how appellate courts should handle future challenges
to the excessiveness of prison sentences due to their length.
Only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice Scalia's opinion, which construed both Anglo-American history and judicial precedent as evidence of the fact that the Eighth
Amendment contains no prohibition on grossly disproportionate prison sentences.
Justice Scalia took issue with the historical analysis
in Helm. Specifically, he rejected the notion that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained
in the English Declaration of Rights had anything to do
with disproportionate punishments. Regarding the debate
surrounding the proper interpretation of Weems, Scalia
concluded that the holding in that case is ambiguous and
provides no clear-cut basis for the existence of a proportionality principle within the Eighth Amendment. As the
Court did in Rummel, Justice Scalia regarded previous
decisions that required proportionality assessments in
capital cases to be limited to just such cases.
The only Supreme Court case that Justice Scalia believed clearly identified a principle of proportionality was
Solem v. Helm. As to Helm's elaboration of a proportionality principle, Justice Scalia concluded that the Court
was "simply wrong." According to Justice Scalia, it was
wrong regarding its explanation of the genesis of the
Eighth Amendment, wrong in its interpretation of Weems
and wrong because it misread the holdings in Rummel
and Davis.
In addition, Justice Scalia addressed the wisdom of
employing such a principle in noncapital cases by examining the three objectifying factors for assessing proportionality that were used by the Court in Helm. Assessing

the first factor, Justice Scalia acknowledges that crimes
of violence will always be deemed to be serious in nature. The problem he sees is with determining what other
crimes are serious and assessing how serious they are
compared to some violent crimes. This determination,
according to Justice Scalia, is inherently subjective and
not susceptible to objective analysis.
The inability to assess objectively the seriousness of a
crime, Scalia reasoned, results as well in the failure of the
second of Helms objectifying factors. As one crime cannot
be deemed to be objectively more serious than another, according to Justice Scalia, it is fruitless to look for other crimes
to use as vehicles for comparison. To Justice Scalia, differential treatment by a state of two arguably serious crimes
merely means that the legislature, for any of a number of
appropriate reasons, perceives greater danger in one type of
serious crime than it does in another. It is not the function
of the courts in such situations, according to Justice
Scalia, to substitute their judgment for that of the duly
elected representatives of the people regarding which
crime is more serious.
As for Helm's third objectifying factor, Justice Scalia
concedes that comparing how other states punish the
crime at issue can be done with "clarity and ease." He
contends, however, that such a comparison has no bearing on an Eighth Amendment challenge. Justice Scalia's
view, mirroring that expressed by the Court in Rummel,
is that our principles of federalism permit, if not encourage, such differential treatment of crimes based on the
different interests of the states involved.
Justice Scalia is correct in his observation that defining seriousness involves a significant amount of subjectivity and in his recognition of the fact tl1at a federalist
system will inevitably result in disparate treatment of
crimes in different jurisdictions. Open to question; however, is his conclusion that these observations negate the
effectiveness of the objectifying factors. While each of
Scalia's points illustrates that no precise calculus of what
constitutes a constitutional prison length can be drawn
from the objectifying factors, neither of them negates
the ability of the factors to point to sentences that are
grossly disproportional to the crimes committed.
Justice Scalia was able to garner the support of only
one other member of the Court for his approach to proportionality challenges under the Eighth Amendment.
Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and two other justices, joined Scalia only in the judgment upholding
Harmelin's sentence and in that portion of Scalia's opinion rejecting the defendant's claim that his sentence was
invalid because it was not individualized.
The opinion of Justice Kennedy is significant for a
variety of reasons. First it makes clear that a majority of
the justices accept the existence of at least some form of
proportionality principle contained within the Eighth
22

Amendment for both capital and noncapital sentences.
conscionable, it is "not our discretion but our duty" to
While acknowledging that Helm takes a different apinterfere, as the Court said in Weems, 217 U.S. at 378.
While a standard of "gross disproportionality" will approach to application of proportionality principles than
either Rummel or Davis, Justice Kennedy sees certain
propriately require less frequent judicial intervention,
common threads running through each of these cases.
when required, such intervention is crucial, in part, beAccording to Justice Kennedy, the first principle to be
cause of its infrequency.
Although Justice Kennedy's attempt to harmonize the
discerned from previous cases is the need for courts to defer
to legislative judgments concerning what constitutes an apopinions of the Supreme Court in previous proportionalpropriate sentence for a particular crime. How and whether
ity cases may be somewhat more persuasive than was
Justice Powell's attempt to do so in Helm, it raises many
a state wishes to punish an offense involve political deterruinations about the needs and interests of the state involved
questions as welL Kennedy's conclusion that prior cases
as well as critical judgments as to what goals , - - - - - - - - - - - - - , are universal in their acceptance of a senof punishment are to be used and in what
. . . while severe
tencing proportionality principle, albeit a
mandatory
narrow one, is at least defensible. His ascombination. Such matters to Kennedy are
fundamentally legislative in nature.
sertion, however, that the use of two of the
punishments
three proportionality criteria adopted by
The second principle Kennedy sees
could be
the Court in Helm is discretionary is far
emerging from previous cases is that legless convincing. In Helm, the Court said
islatures are
to use any of a number of
considered
"it may be helpful to compare sentences
punishment theories in structuring a sentencing system.
cruel, they were
imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction" and "the courts may find it
Next, Kennedy determined that the
not historically
useful" to engage in interjurisdictional
Court, through its previous holdings, had
unusual.
comparison, 463 U.S. at 291. To Justice
recognized that disparate treatment of the
Kennedy this means that courts may also
same crime by different states was an inevitable byproduct of federalism. Differdecide there is no need to engage in such
ences regarding punishment of a particular offense are
comparisons where there is no clear gross
due to the variety of philosophies and concerns that undisproportionality after assessing the seriousness of the
derlie each state's sentencing system. To Justice Kennedy,
offense and harshness of the punishment. This turned out
this makes any interstate sentencing comparison an "imto be a conclusion of some significance, as many courts
faced with challenges to the proportionality of a sentence
perfect enterprise," 501 U.S. at 1000.
The final principle Justice Kennedy sees emerging
after the decision in Harmelin have adopted Justice
from the earlier cases is the importance of relying on
Kennedy's approach.
objective factors, where feasible, to assess proportionalJustice Kennedy's conditional approach to use of the
ity. To Kennedy, the most important objective factor is
comparative analyses criteria can be criticized as to its
the type of punishment imposed. As the penalty of death
efficacy as well. As Kennedy notes, one clear principle
has long been viewed by the Court as unique, a clear line
that emerges from the Court's previous holdings regardcan be drawn between it and a sentence involving jail
ing proportionality is that judicial determinations of the
time. Justice Kennedy, however, does not discern such a
excessiveness of a sentence should not be nor appear to
be merely the individual predilections of the judges inclear line as existing between sentences involving shorter
volved.
exclusive use of the harshness of the crime
and longer periods of incarceration; courts should be exceedingly reluctant to entertain proportionality challenges
cdteria (even if this one-criteria approach is used only
to noncapital sentences.
when there appears to be no gross disproportionality beFew would argue with Justice Kennedy's view oflegtween crime and sentence) runs counter to this principle.
islative primacy in sentencing, the ability of each legisAs Justice White points out in his dissenting opinion in
lature to use various sentencing theories in different comHannelin, it is far more subjective to base proportionalbinations or the inevitable result that some jurisdictions
ity determinations on merely the view of the deciding
will treat certain crimes more harshly than other jurisjudges regarding the seriousness of the crime than it is to
dictions. Merely recognizing these principles, however,
have their judgment informed by the way in which the
without acknowledging the important limits that attach
state treats other criminals and how other states deal with
to each, risks devaluing any proportionality requirement
the crime at issue.
and making
application less effective.
The problem in using only the seriousness of the crime
criterion is evidenced by a look at how Kennedy applies
The Eighth Amendment was designed specifically to
check legislative excesses. While legislatures establish
his proportionality approach to Harmelin's crime and
comparing it with Justice White's application of all three
punishment schemes, when a particular sentence is un23
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criteria in his dissent. Justices Kennedy and White have
a reasonable difference of opinion regarding the seriousness of possessing over 650 grams of cocaine. Although
Kennedy regards the sentence of life without parole as
harsh, he argues that Michigan has the right to determine
that the goal of deterring possession of large amounts of
cocaine warrants such a sentence. He rejects Harmelin's
claim that drug possession should be regarded as a victimless crime, and describes how the effects of drugs harm
not only the user but society as well.
Justice White, in his dissent, concedes that the use of
drugs is serious, but not so serious as sale or possession
with intent to sell, neither of which Harmelin was convicted of. White compares the collateral consequences
of drugs, a factor upon which Justice Kennedy appears
to rely heavily, to those of alcohol. Such consequences,
White asserts, could lead to certain penalties but not to
oppressively harsh ones. Furthermore, in a state such as
Michigan, where there is no capital punishment, life imprisonment is the harshest punishment possible. To apply such a harsh punishment mandatorily, without regard
to the fact that Harmelin is a first offender and without
any suggestion that Harmelin's particular offense was
especially egregious is even more problematic.
In sum, Justice Kennedy and the two justices who join
in his opinion view Harmelin's crime as more serious
than do Justice White and the three other justices who
join with him. Further, the views of both groups of justices seem to be reasonable. Under Justice Kennedy's
approach, once the determination is made that no gross
disproportionality exists based on an assessment of the
seriousness of the crime, analysis stops. In such a situation the subjective views of the judges would appear to
be not just a factor in the decision but the likely determining factor. It would be wiser to tum, as Justice White
then does, to the two comparative analyses to inform any
determination of gross disproportionality.
In so doing Justice White observes that Michigan's harshest penalty is reserved for only two other crimes, both of
which are surely more serious than drug possession. Furthermore, arguably more serious crimes against the person
such as murder in the second degree, rape and armed robbery do not carry mandatory life sentences. It is also significant, according to Justice White, that Michigan is the only
state in which a defendant could receive life without parole
for possessing the amount of drugs Harmelin had. While
this is certainly permissible under our federalist system, that
Michigan treats Harmelin differently than would any other
state informs an assessment of proportionality and even more
obviously objectifies the assessment measurably.
In the wake of Harmelin, following on the decisions
in Rummel, Davis and Helm, a great deal of confusion
exists respecting the application of a proportionality principle to noncapital sentences. Much of that confusion

stems from the inability of the justices to agree upon and
articulate clearly an Eighth Amendment proportionality
principle, and from the mixed signals they have given
with respect to how to apply such a principle. These problems derive from the Court's failure to develop a convincing philosophical basis on which to premise a meaningful ban on grossly disproportional punishments.

Conclusion
The time has come for the Supreme Court to make clear
that it accepts the existence of a proportionality principle
within the Eighth Amendment that applies to excessive
prison sentences. While appellate courts should be reluctant to overturn legislatively sanctioned sentences and
do so only when the sentences are grossly disproportionate to the crime committed, cruel and unusual punishments cannot be allowed to stand.
The three-criteria approach advanced by the Court in
Helm serves as a good foundation for assessing the
disproportionality of a sentence. This approach offers
judges the opportunity to evaluate the seriousness of an
offense by examining such things as the consequences
of the act and the moral wrongfulness of the actor. Additionally, it looks to the harshness of the sentence, considering all possible justifications for the sentence imposed. Finally, it requires comparisons of the crime and
sentence to others within the subject state and in other
states in order to objectify somewhat the conclusion as
to disproportionality. This approach would allow trial
judges to continue to be the principal sentencers, give
them clearer guidance as to what is permissible under
the Eighth Amendment and reduce the number of grossly
excessive prison sentences that are inflicted.

RECENT DECISION

Wisconsin "Sexually Violent Person" Statute Upheld
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recently held constitutional as against due process and ex post facto challenges a state statute that provides for the involuntary
commitment of individuals found to be "sexually violent persons." State v. Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995).
A "sexually violent person" was defined as a person
previously convicted of a violent sex offense "who is
dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person
will engage in acts of sexual violence." The Wisconsin
Supreme Court found no double jeopardy problem existed because this statute's primary purpose was not punishment, retribution or deterrence, but instead protection
of the public and treatment of high risk sex offenders.
Similarly, it was held not to violate ex post facto prohibitions because it serves "a legitimate, regulatory,
nonpunitive function ."
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